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CALL FOR STANDARDIZATION IN PATENT CLAIM 
DRAFTING 
Tao Zhang,† Daniel J. Sherwinter,‡ & Dov Greenbaum§ 
The United States patent system has become a less favorable 
IP protection regime for inventors due to, among other factors, the 
widespread assertion of poor quality patents by patent assertion 
entities, a high percentage of invalidities by the USPTO PTAB under 
the new inter parties review system, and the resulting uncertainty in 
patent value and validity. Although a number of solutions have been 
suggested in the literature, only a truly transparent system will return 
the patent system to one that promotes invention and maintains U.S. 
leadership in innovation. Not only does the proposed tool described 
herein provide that transparency, it is also an effective tool in fighting 
patent trolls and raising the quality of patents. Employing artificial 
intelligence, natural language processing, and machine learning, the 
tool creates a patent system of standardized claim syntax and format 
and a patent system that promotes easy-to-understand, easy-to-parse 
and easy-to-assess patent claims. 
  
                                                             
† Tao Zhang is a senior director of IP Strategy at Huawei Device USA, Inc.  
‡ Daniel J. Sherwinter is a Senior Patent Attorney with Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP.  
§ Dov Greenbaum is Director at the Zvi Meitar Institute for Legal Implications of Emerging 
Technologies and Associate Professor in the Department of Molecular Biophysics and 
Biochemistry at Yale University.  
The views expressed herein are opinions of the authors and do not represent those of the authors’ 
past or current employers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The patent system has lost much of its luster as a mechanism for 
propelling innovation.1 In particular, over the past few years, the U.S. 
patent system has become a significantly less favorable incentive 
pathway for inventors and innovators.2 This is especially the case for 
disillusioned high-tech companies that have become frustrated with 
ever-expanding thickets of qualitatively poor patents3 (particularly 
within the software space)4 that are increasingly asserted by newly 
aggressive plaintiffs.5  
Many of these plaintiffs are non-practicing entities (“NPEs”), 
arguably, a subset of patent assertion entities (“PAEs”)—both 
colloquially known as trolls—who have forced new ground rules into 
the litigation game. According to at least one dataset, 20% of all patent 
litigation in 2017 was associated with plaintiffs that had acquired (i.e., 
not invented in-house, but rather purchased specifically to use 
offensively) the asserted patent.6 Others have suggested that the 
numbers, while falling from prior years, may have been as high as 60% 
                                                             
 1. See Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328 
(2015).  
 2. See Leonid Kravets, Do Patents Really Matter to Startups?, TECHCRUNCH (June 21, 
2012), http://bit.do/Kravets_do-patents (noting that “[o]ne third of all funded companies have 
filed a patent application. 19% of all funded companies filed at least one patent application prior 
to receiving any funding [and] [s]ince 2005, the average start-up has become less likely to apply 
for patents than companies founded in the previous year.”). See also Daniel Hoenig & Joachim 
Henkel, Quality signals? The Role of Patents, Alliances, and Team Experience in Venture Capital 
Financing, 44 RES. POL’Y, 1049 (2015) (Venture capital seems “to appreciate patents only in their 
productive functions as property rights, not as signals of technology quality.”); Hanna Hottenrott, 
Bronwyn H. Hall & Dirk Czarnitzki, Patents as Quality Signals? The Implications for Financing 
Constraints on R&D, 25 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 197, 217 (2016) (“[W]e find that the 
patent signaling effect does not seem to arise in larger firms and . . . that the effect on external 
financing tends to be driven by the mere presence of patents rather than observable ex post 
indicators of the value of those inventions.”). 
 3. See Ronald A. Cass, Patent Litigants, Patent Quality, and Software: Lessons from the 
Smartphone Wars, 16 MINN. J.L., SCI. & TECH. 1 (2015). 
 4. See generally Arti K. Rai, Improving (Software) Patent Quality Through the 
Administrative Process, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 503 (2013); Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software 
Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325 (2012) (Arguably, this could also be due to the reality that at the 
same time that patent thickets have been confounding freedom to operates assessments, the courts 
have been simultaneously confounding the ability to actually obtain new software patents.); see 
also Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 573 U.S. 189 (2014). 
 5. Seemingly, the mutually-assured destruction that prevented large companies from 
suing other companies is no longer a strategy. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, 
Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (2005); Eli Dourado, How Patent Privateers Have 
Eroded Mutually Assured Destruction in the Computer Industry, THE ÜMLAUT (Oct. 2, 2013), 
http://bit.do/Dourado_patent-privateers. 
 6. Shawn P. Miller et al., Introduction to the Stanford NPE Litigation Dataset, (Oct. 23, 
2017) (unpublished manuscript). 
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in 2017.7 Importantly, it is not just the number of patent cases, but also 
the way they are handled; NPEs are not hindered by the (former) reality 
that legal adversaries today may be business partners tomorrow, 
negating the need to play fair.8  
What we can surmise is that, in many instances, NPEs have 
arguably asserted patents in irresponsible and often unpredictable ways 
that seem to serve only to shake down non-competitors.9 This is in stark 
contrast to the litigation that occurred decades ago that aimed primarily 
to protect market share by preventing important and key innovations 
from being infringed by potential competitors.10 Most of today’s NPE 
plaintiffs do not have market share; they just assert their patent 
portfolios against any of the various stakeholders in the market. 
Notably, this phenomenon is now prevalent in other, non-U.S. 
jurisdictions as well.11 
                                                             
 7. Timothy Au, U.S. Patent Litigation on Decline While PTAB Breaks Records and NPE 
Settlement Amounts Fall, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 2, 2018), http://bit.do/Au_US-patent-litigation 
(perhaps reflecting changes in the law relating to venue). 
 8. Stefan Wagner, Are ‘Patent Thickets’ Smothering Innovation?, YALE INSIGHTS (Apr. 
22, 2015), http://bit.do/Wagner_Patent-thickets. See, e.g., John L. Turner, Patent Thickets, Trolls 
and Unproductive Entrepreneurship 5-6 (Sept. 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
University of Georgia, Terry College of Business) (noting that “[a]mong non-NPE cases, the most 
highly represented technology class is Drugs & Medical, at about 26%. Among NPE lawsuits, 
however, less than 1% of lawsuits involve patents from this category. This suggests that the level 
of invention in this industry is below the level needed to induce widespread troll behavior. On the 
other hand, more than 77% of NPE cases involve Computers & Communications patents, 
compared to about 22% in non-NPE cases. Here, troll behavior appears to be flourishing.”). But 
cf. Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing, & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects Of Patent 
Monetization Entities, 17 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 110-11 (2013) (“The study can tell us that there is 
a lot of patent litigation being filed by monetizers, that the amount has increased rapidly over the 
last five years, and that it appears to be continuing to increase. The study cannot identify the 
reasons for the increase in monetization, determine whether the level of litigation by patent 
monetizers is problematic, and if so, identify the solutions to that problem.”). 
 9. David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in 
the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 455 (2013) (“The bigger picture, and the better 
question, is whether the lawsuits are being brought because the defendants are infringers of a valid 
patent or whether the defendants are merely easy targets for a nuisance law-suit.”). See also Eon-
Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1326-27 (9th Cir. 2011) (In particular, the district 
court found that Eon-Net's case against Flagstar had ‘indicia of extortion’ because it was part of 
Eon-Net's history of filing nearly identical patent infringement complaints against a plethora of 
diverse defendants, where Eon-Net followed each filing with a demand for a quick settlement at 
a price far lower than the cost to defend the litigation. The record supports the district court's 
finding that Eon-Net acted in bad faith by exploiting the high cost to defend complex litigation to 
extract a nuisance value settlement from Flagstar.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Edward Lee, Patent Trolls: Moral Panics, Motions in Limine, and Patent 
Reform, 19 STAN. TECH. L.  REV. 113 (2015) (detailing both academic supporters and opponents 
of NPEs).  
 11. The Rise of Non-Practicing Entity (NPE) Cases Outside the United States, DARTS-IP 
http://bit.do/Darts-ip_Rise-NPE; Michael Platzöder, NPE Patent Litigation in Germany: Recent 
Trends and Strategies, LEXOLOGY, (Oct. 12, 2016) (noting that while “[t]raditionally, patent 
litigation initiated by non-practising entities (NPE) has focused predominantly on the U.S. 
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These assertions lead to, among other externalities, uncertainty in 
patent value, an erosion of protectable patent rights, a cheapening (not 
in actual dollars, but in its relevance) of the patent litigation process, 
and growing impediments to research and entrepreneurial efforts due 
to actual or threatened excessive lawsuits and their resulting high 
litigation costs.12 As a result, there is mounting sentiment among those 
various stakeholders at greatest risk of falling prey to NPEs that the 
patent system has failed inventors, and now hinders innovation.13 Many 
companies, especially cash-strapped startups, are appreciably cutting 
back, or even foregoing, patenting altogether (seeing them as primarily 
a negative tool), or looking to operate in areas where patent 
enforcement is weak and the threat of speculative litigation by NPEs is 
less.14  
Again, this is not how things once were: patents are intended to 
promote innovation. Optimally, a patent should provide a limited 
monopoly to an innovator as a quid pro quo for disclosing their 
innovations to the public.15 In an effort to balance further follow-on 
innovation and the innovation associated with the patent itself, patent 
systems were designed to cabin the scope of that limited monopoly 
(i.e., the extent of the collective patent rights) to the specific claims 
within the patents; everything else however was fair game. Like the 
aforementioned destructive NPE litigation, this bargain between patent 
owners and the public has become less helpful in promoting innovation 
or protecting legitimate monopolies. Patents have evolved such that 
their now often-opaque claim language is explicitly designed to, and 
successfully used to, exceed this quid pro quo by allowing patentees to 
post facto grab more than they actually disclosed.16 This is a reality that 
is especially exploited by NPEs. 
                                                             
market,” there is now a shift to other markets due to changes in the U.S. patent system.). 
 12. Catherine E. Tucker et al., The Effect of Patent Litigation and Patent Assertion Entities 
on Entrepreneurial Activity, 45 RES. POL’Y, 218, 231 (2016); Seokbeom Kwon & Kazuyuki 
Motohashi, Effect of Non-Practicing Entities on Innovation Society and Policy: An Agent Based 
Model and Simulation, IAM DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES #033 (“Our result concludes that the 
negative effects of NPEs are likely to outweigh their potential benefits.”). 
 13. Turner, supra note 8; Time to Fix Patents, ECONOMIST (Aug. 8, 2015), 
http://bit.do/TimetoFixPatents. 
 14. Yongwook Paik & Feng Zhu, The Impact of Patent Wars on Firm Strategy: Evidence 
from the Global Smartphone Industry, 27 ORG. SCI. 1397, 1399 (2016). 
 15. See Jacob Adam Schroeder, Written Description: Protecting the Quid Pro Quo Since 
1793, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 63 (2010). 
 16. See, e.g., Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (where the 
plaintiffs claimed their patent read on essentially all e-commerce). See also id. at 1325 
(“Moreover, Eon-Net's failure to engage the claim construction process in good faith was only 
one of many instances of misconduct detailed by the district court. The district court also found 
that Medina displayed a “lack of regard for the judicial system” and that Eon-Net and Medina had 
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NPEs exploit some particular characteristics of the modern patent. 
To wit: patent claims are, by common convention, inherently terse 
collections of words.17 Arguably, patent claims are one of the most 
complex and difficult to interpret collections of words in the legal 
canon.18 Which words are chosen to describe an invention, how those 
words are combined to form patent claims, and how those words are 
eventually defined (e.g., in context of a litigation and other judicial 
proceedings) will ultimately determine if a competitor’s product 
infringes the granted patent or not.19 Thus, part of the operating risk 
calculus of any firm that has good patent counsel will depend on the 
uncertainty surrounding how future legal arbitrators will define both its 
and its competitors’ patents. 
As such, the value of a patent is inextricably tied to its semantics. 
Given their inherent uncertainty, semantic ambiguities are especially 
valuable in the patent space where they can be leveraged to expand the 
scope of the patent monopoly beyond what might have been originally 
appreciated by the inventor, or to circumvent new developments in 
patent law.20  
Stepping back, we are not equating talented patent wordsmiths 
with the bad actors associated with NPEs. This opaqueness is not 
necessarily nefarious, but rather a necessity of doing business, as 
changes in patent law are retroactive without grandfathering in already 
allowed patents. With both legal and technological innovations 
hanging as swords of Damocles above each patent, patent drafters have 
to be creative. Patents must be prosecuted today to be robust in light of 
unknowable statutory, regulatory, judicial, and technological changes 
tomorrow. Arguably, to not do so could be construed as malpractice. 
                                                             
a “cavalier attitude” towards the “patent litigation process as a whole.”). 
 17. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 
1991). 
 18. Simon Mille & Leo Wanner, Making Text Resources Accessible to the Reader: The 
Case of Patent Claims, INT’L LANGUAGE RESOURCES & EVALUATION CONF. PROC. 1393, 1393 
(2008). 
 19. See, e.g., Shawn P. Miller, “Fuzzy” Software Patent Boundaries and High Claim 
Construction Reversal Rates, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 809, 811 (2014) (citing JAMES BESSEN ET 
AL., PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 
141 (2008)) (Noting that “owners and producers cannot be certain of the legal scope of any patent 
until the Federal Circuit has spoken.”). 
 20. For example, via the doctrine of equivalents. See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. 
Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 
520 U.S. 17, 36 (1997); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 
619 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“A primary justification for the [doctrine of equivalents] is to accommodate 
after-arising technology. Without the [doctrine of equivalents], any claim drafted in current 
technological terms could be easily circumvented after the advent of an advance in technology.”); 
see also Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law's Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 1, 36-37 (2009) (outlining the fairness justifications for the doctrine of equivalents). 
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However, these realities also make novelty point identification, prior 
art searches, and patent comparison difficult or even unfeasible—and 
these factors are exploited by less-than-good actors. 
For example, though the purpose of patent claims is to define the 
scope of an innovation, patent claims are typically written in a manner 
that is rife with obfuscation, full of subtle attempts to exploit or avoid 
legal precedent and future legal and technological uncertainty. Further 
confounding the system is the reality that most patents are drafted in 
highly inconsistent forms depending on the drafters, their clients, and 
myriad other factors, knowable and unknowable.  
Professor Duffy highlights an ironic example as to how the current 
system dramatically fails to limit the negative externalities of these 
ambiguities. This is due to the nature of the courts to generally accept 
those ambiguities in patent claims.21 Notably, the general acceptance 
of these ambiguities within the patent system and by its gatekeepers—
the courts (further ironically, itself the result of inherently ambiguous 
legislation)22—are arguably a failure of the characteristic notice 
function23 of patents.  
But it gets worse: bad patent actors bask in those ambiguities24 
and in the imprecise terminology of many patents that lacks reasonable 
certainty to exploit those ambiguities beyond what normative patent 
law had accepted. These bad actors use those ambiguities to extract 
rents from any innovator that can be caught in their dragnets, taxing 
                                                             
 21. John F. Duffy, Counterproductive Notice in Literalistic versus Peripheral Claiming, 
96 B.U. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (“Spending vast resources to find a supposedly precise and correct 
interpretation of claims, only to have that interpretation lead to the invalidation of the claims, is 
not merely wasteful but also counterproductive. If there is a justification for spending millions of 
dollars during years of litigation to find the correct interpretation of a patent claim, that 
justification must be that such litigation might lead, in the future, to better and more certain notice 
of property rights”) (describing the protracted and circuitous litigation in Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. 
Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 22. Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(Gajarsa, J., concurring) (“In my judgment, the text of § 112, ¶ 1 is a model of legislative 
ambiguity. The interpretation of the statute, therefore, is one over which reasonable people can 
disagree, and indeed, reasonable people have so disagreed for the better part of a decade.”). 
 23. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002) (“A patent holder should know what he owns, 
and the public should know what he does not.”). 
 24. Although some have argued that the nature of language inherently also creates 
ambiguities, without the intention of bad actors. See, e.g., Amir H. Khoury, The “Unlimitless”: 
On How to Remedy the Inadequacies of a Language-Based System for Patent Claims, 24 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 103, 129 (2016). 
2018] CALL FOR STANDARDIZATION  297 
innovation. This is especially the case in the area of software,25 where 
definiteness26 is sorely lacking and NPEs are active.27  
The concern of ambiguities and all of its repercussions is not 
novel; it is a longstanding issue within patent law.28 The United States 
Patent Office explicitly tied the reforming of claim language to the 
improvement of patent quality,29 itself a nebulous quantity.30 
All this handwringing regarding the legitimate and illegitimate 
use of ambiguities notwithstanding, it is our contention that good patent 
actors generally abhor using such ambiguities and the realities those 
ambiguities have created, even with all of their associated legitimate 
benefits. Rather, innovative companies and investors would prefer, or 
at least benefit greatly from, the legal clarity of better-defined patent 
rights arising from better-defined claim language—i.e., rights that are 
stronger and more certain, even if potentially narrower in scope.31  
To this end, we believe that a vibrant and transparent patent 
system, e.g., where all parties and stakeholders each share the same 
understanding of the scope of each patent, and its exacting metes and 
bounds, will return the patent system to one that promotes innovation, 
maintains United States leadership in technological developments, and 
advances world–changing technologies.32 This is particularly true in 
                                                             
 25. Arti K. Rai, Improving (Software) Patent Quality Through the Administrative Process, 
51 HOUS. L. REV. 503, 505 (2013). 
 26. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2013). 
 27. See Sona Karakashian, A Software Patent War: The Effects of Patent Trolls on Startup 
Companies, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 119, 155 (2015). 
 28. Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1876) (“The genius of the inventor . . . should 
not be restrained by vague and indefinite descriptions of claims in existing patents from the 
salutary and necessary right of improving on that which has already been invented.”). 
 29. MPEP § 2173 (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan. 2018) (“Optimizing patent quality by providing 
clear notice to the public of the boundaries of the inventive subject matter protected by a patent 
grant fosters innovation and competitiveness. Accordingly, providing high quality patents is one 
of the agency’s guiding principles. The Office recognizes that issuing patents with clear and 
definite claim language is a key component to enhancing the quality of patents and raising 
confidence in the patent process.”); see United States Patent & Trademark Office 2010-2015 
Strategic Plan, USPTO (2010), http://bit.do/USPTO_2010-2015-Strategic. 
 30. Christi J. Guerrini, Defining Patent Quality, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3091, 3096 (2014). 
See, e.g., James E. Malackowski & Jonathan A. Barney, What is Patent Quality? A Merchant 
Banc’s Perspective, 43 LES NOUVELLES 123, 124-28 (2008)  
 31. See, e.g., Soonwoo Hong, IP and Business: Quality Patents: Claiming what Counts, 
WIPO MAG. (Feb. 2006), http://bit.do/Hong_IP-Business. 
 32. Matthew Herper, New Patent Law Would Trash Disease Cures, FORBES (March 24, 
2015), http://bit.do/Herper_New-Patent-Law (“Weakening patent laws will decimate long-term 
investment in cures for diseases such as Alzheimer's, Parkinson's, and Huntington's, as well as 
funding for new therapies to treat autism and breast, colon, lymphoma and prostate cancer . . . Let 
us be clear: investments in the biotech industry are based entirely on patents. Without strong 
patents, we cannot raise money to find cures for disease.”). See also David Kline, Do Patents 
Really Promote Innovation?, MICHELSON INST. FOR INTELL. PROP. (Apr. 24, 2017), 
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today’s increasingly globalized economy, where information is readily 
available at one’s fingertips regardless of those fingertips’ current 
location.  
We further believe that with a better patent system, inventors will 
be motivated by the classical limited patent monopoly awarded to 
innovators, when their efforts are adequately rewarded via an 
enforceable monopolistic patent, even when that patent scope is 
limited. Moreover, with a transparent patent system, those inventors 
who may not have been previously motivated to patent may now find 
use in patenting. Especially because a transparent patent system, with 
well-defined terms, will eventually be a cheaper and more accessible 
patent system for all stakeholders, at all levels of prosecution, 
litigation, and licensing processes. 
Why change the patent system? Maybe we should let it crumble 
under its own bloated weight? Patents, when used properly and 
effectively, can provide critical motivation and security to inventors, 
and validation to their corresponding investors by creating protectable, 
robust intellectual property rights. Consequently, proper patent 
protection enables both innovation and essential third-party 
investment.33 
In sum, one of the main concerns voiced by stakeholders relates 
to the opacity of patents and the scope of the claims: patents are valid 
and potentially encompass their broadest possible scope, until they are 
found to be invalid, and parties are often unwilling to settle patent 
disputes until the courts construe the scope of their claims.34 Moreover, 
the scope of that presumed valid patent is effectively indeterminable 
until the patent is litigated, an admittedly increasingly rare 
occurrence.35 And even when litigated, there is a more than 50% chance 
                                                             
http://bit.do/Kline_Do-Patents (citing the economists “Arrow (1962), Griliches (1963), 
Schmookler (1966), Kitch (1977), Reinganum (1981), Klemperer (1990), Romer (1990), Giulbert 
and Shapiro (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Scotchmer (1999), and Gallini (2002)”). But 
cf. The Experts: Does the Patent System Encourage Innovation?, WALL ST. J. (May 16, 2013), 
http://bit.do/WSJ_The-experts; Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Do Patents Help or 
Hinder Innovation?, WORLD ECON. F. (May 14, 2013), http://bit.do/Galasso_Do-patents-help. 
 33. But cf. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Do Patents Stimulate R&D Investment and 
Promote Growth?, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 13, 2018), http://bit.do/Bessen_Do-patents-stimulate 
(“The evidence certainly is consistent with the notion that patents encourage American 
pharmaceutical R&D. But otherwise, it is hard to find evidence suggesting patents are a major 
factor spurring R&D investment, that patents contribute to economic growth, or even that the 
patent system is a source of great wealth to important inventors and innovators (outside of a few 
industries like pharmaceuticals)”). 
 34. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim 
Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1745 (2009). 
 35. LEX MACHINA, Lex Machina Q4 2016 Litigation Update (Jan. 12, 2017), 
http://bit.do/LexMachina_2016 (“Overall litigation in 2016 has declined by a moderate 22% from 
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that the appellate court will modify the district court decision.36 Thus, 
patent ambiguities that are there by design nevertheless prevent the 
adequate assessment of a patent value and hinder the ability to predict 
the outcome of patent litigation. 
The proposed changes herein are non-trivial; interpreting claims 
and cabining claim scope is a multi-factor problem. In this paper, we 
discuss some of the factors driving poor patent quality resulting from 
ambiguities and propose a solution—our Patents with Applied 
Standardized Structure (PASS) approach—and some considerations 
for promoting adoption of the proposed PASS approach. 
I. POOR PATENT QUALITY RESULTS FROM DIFFICULTIES 
REGARDING CLAIM INTERPRETATION 
Poor patent quality is a central concern for many stakeholders.37 
Simply, poor patents result in patents that should not have been granted 
in their current form. These types of patents are often an unappreciated 
cost in innovation ecosystems, and at best, they might only create 
unnecessary costs associated with licensing or threat of litigation. At 
worst, they force companies to pivot or to stop innovation in that space 
entirely.  
Moreover, patent quality is an issue even when the patent is 
deserved. Poorly drafted patents can be hard to parse by competitors or 
are too broad or too narrow to optimally protect those innovations that 
objectively deserve to be patented, creating costly confusion and 
uncertainty amongst all relevant stakeholders. 
All of the many actors in the patent pathway—from the inventors, 
to their managers, to the patent attorneys, to the patent examiners, to 
the relevant arbitrators—share the blame for the current state of 
affairs.38 Their combined actions have made it nearly unachievable for 
competing innovators, investors, patent litigation juries, and others to 
accurately construe claim terms and ultimately their scope. As a result 
                                                             
2015”). 
 36. Chris Barry, Ronen Arad, Landan Ansell, Meredith CarTier & HyeYun Lee, PWC 
2016 Patent Litigation Study, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (May 2016), 
http://bit.do/PWC_2016-patent. 
 37. Michelle K. Lee, Remarks at the Patent Quality Conference Keynote at the USPTO 
(Dec. 13, 2016), http://bit.do/USPTO_Remarks-Lee. See also Peter S. Menell, A Method for 
Reforming the Patent System, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 487, 506 (2007); Julie E. 
Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property 
Implications of “Lock-Out” Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1177–80 (1995). 
 38. See, e.g., Bruce Berman, Patent Quality—is a “Shared Responsibility,” Says IBM; It 
Does Not Represent Invention Quality or IP Value, IP CLOSEUP (Mar. 26, 2015), 
http://bit.do/Berman_Patent-quality. 
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of the current system, a significant percentage of patents likely should 
not have been granted and should not be enforceable.  
We believe in the patent system and the underlying premise that 
an idea that is both novel and nonobvious ought to be patentable, and 
its royalty rents are justified as a promoter of innovation. However, 
when a large number of poor-quality patents are granted (partially 
because the situation described above often makes novelty point 
identification, prior art searches, and patent comparison difficult or 
even unfeasible at times), the quid pro quo balance of the patent system 
is disrupted. Such patents fail to provide desirable public disclosure, 
and instead tend to add to the aforementioned undesirable thickets and 
rents for innovators. Any demands by patent holders for royalty 
payment based on such poor-quality patents are not only unfair, but, 
according to the accepted calculus of the patent system of one limited 
monopoly per patent, actually inhibit innovation.  
Demanding higher quality patents may not necessarily reduce the 
number of patent applications or reduce the burden on overworked 
examiners. It will, however, likely shrink the number of final allowable 
patents. Higher quality patents are not just simply per se patentable, 
they arguably have a determinable and definable scope. Those qualities 
are also valuable to the system at large.  
To reiterate: this is an important goal. The inherent difficulty 
(particularly, a priori) in determining the quality of any particular 
patent, and the assumption that many of those patents are of low 
quality, can effectively cast a shadow over the quality of all patents, 
thereby eroding the value of all patent rights and the ability of all 
patents to provide incentives to real innovation.  
Innovators can better avoid costs associated with pursuing 
protection for innovations that would read on prior art and/or would 
infringe extant patent rights, and examiners can devote more of their 
limited time to innovations with a higher likelihood of patentability if 
the patenting process was more standardized and the scope of patents 
more predictable. Accordingly, one or more mechanisms for 
standardizing patent claim drafting would help address many of the 
root causes of poor patent quality. 
Notably, optimizing patent claims through our proposed PASS 
system is not only of relevance to competitors within related fields—
by making it easier to assess relevant patents in their fields—but it is 
also useful in the context of the global patent examination process. 
Giving examiners a better understanding of the scope of a patent 
application enables a more reliable determination of whether a 
particular innovation already exists within the prior art, which would 
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increase examination quality and reduce examination time and costs 
for all parties.  
II. THE PROPOSED PASS SOLUTION – STANDARDIZED 
CLAIM FORMAT CONSISTING OF PRE-POPULATED KEY 
TERMS LINKED BY CONNECTORS 
We propose a two-tiered system for U.S. patent applications. The 
First Tier would comprise the majority of drafted claims and would 
require the implementation of standardized terminologies, as described 
herein. These Tier-One patents would have an optimized claim 
language with the express goal of clarity over opacity. The second tier 
of patents would be a much smaller cohort (hopefully mostly legacy 
claim sets) that for one reason or another are not yet standardized. Tier 
Two patents would be incentivized to switch to the standardization of 
Tier One patents but may not necessarily be wholly standardized. For 
example, Tier One patents can receive discounts on official fees, 
prioritized examination, an automated first Office Action, and/or other 
benefits. In the alternative, new Tier Two patents would have to pay 
additional fees to avoid the proposed system. An evaluation of such 
benefits would be the focus of future study. 
More specifically, in Tier One patents, each claim would be built 
from a closed group of pre-defined elements where each element is 
defined by one or more key terms semantically linked by connectors. 
This idea of clearly defining claim terms is not entirely novel, Professor 
Hal Wegner suggests that patents were intended to include a section 
devoted to this need.39 Moreover, patentees are clearly within their 
rights to set their own definitions for terms the Federal Circuit has 
expressly allowed the patentee “to act as its own lexicographer [ . . . if 
they] clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term' other than 
its plain and ordinary meaning.”40 
Granted, it is non-trivial to optimally build claims from an open 
set of terms, all the more so from a limited set of terms. To this end, 
key terms and their relevant connectors could be suggested to the 
drafter by a machine learning algorithm that creates the claims based 
on the description in the patent itself; this would be an iterative process. 
As the description is modified, the claims would as well. Machines are 
                                                             
 39. Letter from Harold C. Wegner to Hon. Michelle K. Lee, Under Secretary of Commerce, 
USPTO 43 (June 3, 2015), http://bit.do/Wegner_Limelight, (blaming the USPTO for failing to 
teach new practitioners how to adequately draft patents: “[i]n fact, passing the examination 
requires zero practical patent drafting skills”).  
 40. Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm't Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
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already capable of complex natural language processing,41 and moving 
to the actual drafting of a claim is not a significant technical leap.42 
Alternatively, claim drafters may also select terms from an extensive 
but pre-populated pull-down menu (in a software program, or 
otherwise metaphorical). In either case, the drafter would be 
incentivized/forced to select from terms with well-(pre)defined 
meaning. Each term would be associated with a clear and concise 
glossary that lays out the metes and bounds of that term.  
Patents are rarely truly totally novel (in the popular meaning of 
the word) and it is likely that most drafters would be able to optimally 
describe their invention from this closed set of terms. Still, when 
necessary, patent drafters would be able to petition the USPTO to allow 
additional terms, provided that they also provide a glossary for their 
new or revised terminologies. A streamlined process would allow the 
USPTO to quickly allow or deny the addition of a term to the closed 
set of terms for each art. Once allowed, the new term would become 
part of the lexicon, allowing other drafters to also use the term, when 
necessary.  
The process of introducing new terms into the closed set need not 
necessarily be via the USPTO itself. Other members of the patent bar 
could be given the chance to weigh in and comment on new proposed 
terms, perhaps even incentivized through the gamification of the 
process.43 Consider the popular Waze traffic application wherein traffic 
notices provided by one user can be accepted or discarded by other 
users within the network. Seniority within the system would result in 
weighting of the acceptance or discarding of terms, with more senior 
participants carrying more weight. Like the Waze app, the inputs from 
other users would not come with any remuneration for added activity 
within the system. In the alternative, these peer gatekeepers could be 
rewarded with discounts in the patenting process.  
This effort is actually not too difficult to implement: many 
professional patent drafters already employ a relatively closed set of 
terms for each art, and a relatively consistent style in drafting their 
                                                             
 41. See, e.g., Tom Young et al., Recent Trends in Deep Learning Based Natural Language 
Processing, COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MAG. (2018). 
 42. See, e.g., Linda Andersson et al., The Portability of Three Types of Text Mining 
Techniques Into the Patent Text Genre, in CURRENT CHALLENGES IN PATENT INFORMATION 
RETRIEVAL 241 (Mihai Lupu et al. ed., 2d ed. 2017); Akihiro Shinmori et al., Patent Claim 
Processing for Readability: Structure Analysis and Term Explanation, in 2003 ACL WORKSHOP 
ON PAT. CORPUS PROCESSING PROC. 56; Yuen-Hsien Tseng et al., Text Mining Techniques for 
Patent Analysis, 43 INFO. PROCESSING & MGMT. 1216 (2007). 
 43. Jesús Eduardo et al., Gamification: An Effective Mechanism to Promote Civic 
Engagement and Generate Trust?, in 8 INT’L CONF. ON THEORY & PRAC. ELECTRONIC 
GOVERNANCE PROC. 514 (2014). 
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patents. Accordingly, for many, adoption of the proposed Tier One 
standardized claiming would entrench, and even further refine, their 
current practices while at the same time constraining only a minority 
of peers at the tail-end by limiting the use of extraneous and less clearly 
defined terms.  
There are many advantages of such a standardized claim structure 
for these Tier One patents, with pre-defined key terms connected by 
pre-defined connectors, including the following: 
a) It prompts patent attorneys to streamline claim drafting and 
focus on the novelty points, while also mitigating obfuscation; 
b) It enforces more disciplined selection of claim terms and 
consistent usage of those terms throughout the claims, 
specification, and drawings; 
c) It enables easy prior art searching by the inventor or patent 
drafter so that they can avoid wasting time on an idea not 
worth pursuing;  
d) It simplifies the patent examination process and thus assists 
patent examiners to go through more cases with high quality 
results; 
e) It simplifies claim construction, allowing putative infringers 
to have a better idea of the scope and nature of the claim;  
f) It simplifies the drafting process to allow for the even the 
iconic garage inventor to draft their own claims without the 
need of professional counsel; and 
g) Patent drafters can propose their own broadest reasonable 
interpretation.44 
III. DETAILED DESCRIPTION – STRUCTURED PATENT CLAIM 
DRAFTING UNDER PASS AND ASSOCIATED EXAMPLES 
Even complicated claims can be simplified to key elements. As an 
example, a simplified claim structure should look like the following, 
with the key terms underlined and the prepositions or connectors in 
parenthesis: 
 
CLAIM 1: 
 (preposition0.1 or connector0.1) method, comprising: 
  term1.1 (connector1.1) term1.2 (connector 1.2) 
term1.3; 
                                                             
 44. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (“A claim in an unexpired patent that will not expire before 
a final written decision is issued shall be given its broadest reasonable construction in light of the 
specification of the patent in which it appears.”). 
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  term2.1 (connector2.1) term2.2 (connector 2.2) 
term2.3; and 
  term3.1 (connector3.1) (connector 3.2) term3.2 
(connector 3.3) term3.3. 
 
When a claim is distilled down to the above bare-bone structure, 
it becomes more transparent for patent drafters to figure out which step 
is truly the novelty step, and it becomes extremely easy to perform prior 
art searches. Of course, patent drafters may still prefer to include 
additional adjectives, adverbs, or other modifiers to further refine each 
term. These adjectives would have to be defined by the patentee as part 
of the submission. 
A. Example #1: A Method Claim 
We’ll use an actual patent example, U.S. Patent 7,126,588, 
“Multiple mode display apparatus,” to illustrate our proposal. Claim 1 
reads as follows (with the key terms underlined and the prepositions or 
connectors in parenthesis as illustrated above):  
 
Claim 1: 
(A) method comprising:  
opening (a) first housing attached (with) (a) display device having 
(a) first display area (and) (a) second display area; 
uncovering (the) second display area (to) activate (the) second 
display area; 
closing (the) first housing over (the) display device (to) cover 
(the) second display area (and) place (the) display device (in) (a) first 
mode of reduced power consumption, wherein (the) first display area 
is visible (and) is active; (and) 
closing (a) second housing over (the) display device (to) cover 
(the) first display area (and) (to) place (the) display device in (a) second 
mode of reduced power consumption. 
 
Using the Patent Deconstruction approach described in an IP 
book, Mining Ideas for Diamonds, authored by Tao Zhang & Jingui 
Fang,45 one can obtain a visual schematic for Claim 1 as shown in 
Figure 1. In MINING IDEAS FOR DIAMONDS, typically square boxes 
represent objects or nouns, elliptical shapes for actions, and single lined 
arrows point from subjects to objects or simply connect the two through 
                                                             
 45. TAO ZHANG & JINGUI FANG, MINING IDEAS FOR DIAMONDS –COMPARING CHINA AND 
U.S. IP PRACTICES FROM IDEA SELECTION TO PATENT MONETIZATION 174 (2016). 
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certain connectors, while double-lined arrows are main elements of 
Claim 1. In Figure 1 for this article, for the purpose of clarity, we use 
each color to represent each main element of the claim. For example, 
we use thin, single-lined arrows to represent the first main element of 
Claim 1, double-lined arrows for the second main element, triple-lined 
arrows for the third main element, and thick, single-lined arrows for 
the last main element. 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of Claim 1 in its original unaltered 
written form. 
Furthermore, following the steps detailed by Tao Zhang et al., one 
can remove boxes or shapes that appear redundant or unnecessarily 
narrows to simply the claim structure to the most relevant key elements. 
This way, the claim becomes more generic and thus can be more easily 
compared with other claims. Specifically, we use the following 
conversion relationships i) through iv), where “=>” means “to be 
replaced by”: 
i) display device => display 
ii) uncovering the 2nd display area to activate the 2nd 
display area => uncovering to activate the 2nd area 
iii) closing the 1st housing over the display device to cover 
the 2nd display area and place the display device in a 1st 
mode of reduced power consumption wherein the 1st 
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display area is visible and is active => closing the 1st 
housing over the 2nd area to cause the 1st mode  
iv) closing a 2nd housing over the display device to cover the 
1st display area and to place the display device in a 2nd 
mode of reduced power consumption => closing a 2nd 
housing over the 1st area to cause the 2nd mode. 
 
 
Figure 2. Schematics of the bare-bone structure of an exemplary patent 
Claim 1. 
After performing such simplification, one should be able to arrive 
at the following bare-bone simple structure for Claim 1:  
 
Claim 1: 
(A) method, comprising: 
opening (a) 1st housing (attached to) (a) display (with) (a) 1st 
area, (a) 2nd area, (a) 1st mode (wherein) (the) 1st area is visible and 
active, (and) (a) 2nd mode; 
uncovering (to activate) (the) 2nd area; 
closing (the) 1st housing (over) (the) 2nd area (to cause) (the) 1st 
mode; (and) 
closing (a) 2nd housing (over) (the) 1st area (to cause) (the) 2nd 
mode.  
 
Such simplified bare-bone claim structure can be represented by 
the claim schematics depicted in Figure 2. With a detailed studying of 
such schematics, one can easily find out whether there are additional 
ways to further simplify the claim, and whether there are any missing 
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elements or mistakes in claim structure. From such clear schematics, 
one can easily compare claims and determine which step(s) are the 
novel portions, and which part(s) overlap with pre-existing prior art 
(i.e., documents, patent applications, or product features). In addition, 
it becomes easier to determine whether subsequent products infringe 
the claimed inventions.  
On the other hand, if patent drafters prefer to write a more 
complicated claim structure, they can easily expand each box in Figure 
2 and change the simplified bare-bone Claim 1 to a more complex 
original Claim 1 by using the reverse conversion relationships defined 
in the above bullet points i) through iv). 
To further illustrate that such claim structure works for various 
types of patents, we will deep dive into a few additional examples. 
Besides the process claim for a software invention in the above, we’ll 
also look at an apparatus claim, a hardware invention, and a 
pharmaceutical invention.  
B. Example #2: An Apparatus Claim 
For simplicity, we will use the same patent discussed above, U.S. 
Patent 7,126,588, “Multiple mode display apparatus,” and look at its 
Claim 12 as an example. 
 
Claim 12: 
(An) apparatus comprising:  
(a) first housing (having) (a) first edge, (the) first housing 
comprising (a) display device (having) (a) first display area (and) (a) 
second display area;  
(a) second housing (pivotally attached with) (said) first housing 
(proximate) (said) first edge (in) (a) first closed position (substantially 
coplanar with) (the) first housing (wherein) (the) second display area 
(is placed in) (a) mode of reduced power consumption (and) (is) 
visually (obscured by) (the) second housing (but) (the) first display area 
(is) visible (and) (is) activated to display output, (the) second housing 
(pivotally displaceable) (to) (a) first open position (wherein) (the) first 
display area (and) (the) second display area (are) both visible (and) 
(are) both activated (to) display output; (and) 
(a) third housing (pivotally attached) (with) (said) second housing 
(displaceable to) (a) second closed position (substantially coplanar 
with) (the) first housing (wherein) (the) first display area (and) (the) 
second display area (are) both covered (and) (are) both deactivated (to) 
display output, (the) third housing (displaceable to) (a) second open 
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position (wherein) at least (the) first display area (is) visible (and) (is) 
activated (to) display output. 
 
Using the principles discussed above, one can easily simplify this 
Claim 12 to a bare-bone structure, which makes comparison to prior 
arts and determination of infringement extremely straightforward. 
We’ll leave such a task to readers as a follow up exercise. 
C. Example #3: A Hardware Claim 
Next, we will take a look at a hardware invention with a very early 
priority date, Claim 1 of U.S. Patent 4,327,459, “Combined steam and 
vacuum cleaner,” as an example. 
 
Claim 1: (A) portable steam cleaning machine comprising, (in 
combination),  
(an) electrolytic generator (for) generating steam, (said) generator 
consisting (of)  
(a pair of) spaced carbon rods,  
(a) sealed receptacle (for) containing (said) carbon rods, 
(said) receptacle (having) (an) inlet port (and) (an) outlet port,  
(a) positive displacement pump (having) (an) inlet port (and) 
(an) outlet port,  
(a) tank (for) holding (a) liquid solution, tubular means (for) 
interconnecting (said) tank (and) (said) inlet port (of) (said) pump,  
tubular means (for) interconnecting (said) outlet port (of) 
(said) pump (and) (said) inlet port (of) (said) receptacle,  
tubular nozzle means (including) tubular means (having) 
(one) end (connected to) (said) outlet port (of) (said) receptacle, 
(and) 
 electrical means (for) simultaneously energizing (said) 
carbon rods (and) (said) pump, (whereby) liquid (from) (said) tank 
(is) fed (by) (said) pump (into) (said) receptacle (to) contact both 
(of) (said) carbon rods (and) close (an) electrical circuit (for) 
(said) electrolytic generator (for) producing substantially instant 
steam (to be) discharged (from) (said) nozzle means (upon) (a) 
surface (to be) cleaned. 
D. Example #4: A Software Claim 
Next, we will take a look at a software invention with an early 
priority date, Claim 1 of U.S. Patent 5,566,134, “Digital computer 
algorithm for processing sonar signals,” as an example. 
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Claim 1: (A) method (in) which (one or more) input spectra (in) digital 
form, which (are) formed (from) associated time-segments (of) (a) 
voltage-vs.-time representation of a real-time signal, (are) analyzed 
(for) persistent signal content (and) (are) converted (to) digital data that 
(are) representative (of) (such) persistent signal content (for) display 
(upon) (a) display system, (the) method comprising (the) steps (of):  
A. performing frequency analysis (on) each one (of) a series (of) 
time segments (of) (a) voltage-vs.-time representation of a real-time 
signal (to) produce, (a) digital power spectrum (for) generating a series 
(of) digital power spectra (corresponding to) (the) series (of) time-
segments;  
B. generating (a) preliminary estimate (of) regular spectral 
features (possibly due to signals) (by) integrating successive ones (of) 
(said) digital power spectra, (as) they (are) available (after) (said) 
frequency analysis, (into) (an) integrated ALI (Automatic-Line-
Integrator) buffer (in) (a) digital computer using (an) ALI algorithm 
(of) (a) stored program;  
C. assigning ABTs (Automatic-Band-Trackers) (in) (said) digital 
computer (to) detect, follow (in) frequency (and) enhance (any) lines 
(or) line-sets present (in) (one or more) (of) (said) digital power spectra, 
in response (to) (an) operator-request (or) (to) internal control;  
D. combining (the) enhanced lines (or) line-sets (from) (said) 
ABTs (and) other sources;  
E. displaying (said) combined enhanced lines (or) line-sets (in) 
(an) appropriate visual display. 
E. Example #5: A Pharmaceutical Claim 
Next, we will take a look at a pharmaceutical invention which is 
still active and thus more representative of modern claim drafting 
styles, Claim 1 of U.S. Patent 7,790,677, “Insulin production methods 
and pro-insulin constructs,” as an example. 
 
Claim 1: (A) composition comprising (a) peptide comprising:  
B chain (–) 
RREAEALQVGQVELGGGPGAGSLOPLALEGSLQAR (SEQ ID 
NO: 32)(–) 
A chain,  
(wherein) (said) A chain (and) (said) B chain (are) native 
human insulin chains.  
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As can be seen from the above five examples, which cover various 
type of technology and complexity of claims, all or nearly all can be 
represented using the structure described at the beginning of Section 
III. 
IV. USING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO ASSIST 
STANDARDIZATION OF CLAIM STRUCTURE 
The count of the present library of granted patents already 
numbers close to ten million as of the time of this writing. While it 
might be straightforward to retroactively change all patents within the 
library, changing the scope of those patent claims without the 
knowledge or permission of the patentee would not be binding. 
Nevertheless, a shadow dataset of patents can be created for reference. 
Thus, natural language process algorithms can be applied to the entirety 
of the patent database to parse each of the already granted claim into 
its main elements, where each element consists of words or terms and 
prepositions or connectors. Patents can be automatically or manually 
classified, for example, into group art units, U.S. patent classifications 
(UPC), international patent classifications (IPC), and/or other suitable 
classification schemes. This classification can help to improve 
contextual processing of terms and help to build a glossary for future 
use in technologies and groups of related patents.  
A. Application After Issuance 
Recent rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (“AI”) can 
facilitate and simplify the retroactive application of the PASS approach 
described herein to the vast library of patents. The massive patent 
library could be used as a massive training set for developing, refining, 
and validating the machine learning algorithms on which PASS will be 
built. Patentees could also be incentivized to convert their current 
patent applications to the PASS system. Granted that few patents would 
be able to go through the conversion under current law,46 a new 
proceeding could be developed to simplify the process and allow for a 
greater number of such amendments.47 
  
                                                             
 46. See Jennifer R. Turchyn, Improving Patent Quality Through Post-Grant Claim 
Amendments: A Comparison of European Opposition Proceedings and U.S. Post-Grant 
Proceedings, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1497 (2016). 
 47. With only prospective applying amendments and few options for non-narrowing 
amendments, the current process is far from simple. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2012). 
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B. Application During Drafting 
As described above, optimally, PASS could also be applied during 
the drafting process (e.g., in real time). We envision that patent drafters 
would be able to draft patents within a software application (e.g., a 
cloud-based application or a word processing program plug-in) that 
runs PASS modules, such as a PASS parser, PASS debugger, and 
PASS compiler. During the drafting process, AI algorithms can be used 
to aid in the selection of USPTO pre-approved key terms and 
connectors based on the patentees notes or the already drafted 
specifications. For example, the software would suggest likely 
subsequent connector and word combinations or provide lists of 
alternative terms. Algorithms can also be used to validate proposed 
claims and/or elements as they are written, based on the text of the 
patent itself, as well as the entirety of the known patent library. For 
example, drafted claims or claim elements could be automatically 
checked for consistency with other claims and the specifications, 
validated against prior art, and checked for support within the figures 
and detailed description. Much of this technology is already available 
for drafters, however, the use of consistent terminology would make 
such efforts more robust.  
C. Application During Prosecution 
Another application of PASS could occur during the examination 
(prosecution) process. The consistency and structure provided by 
PASS can facilitate use of patent office AI algorithms to quickly and 
automatically check applications for issues such as antecedent basis, 
clarity, written description support, indefiniteness, etc. Further, the 
PASS structure can improve the ability of algorithms to assess novelty 
and potentially even non-obviousness. For example, the nearly ten 
million patents, vast library of computer-accessible human knowledge, 
libraries of prosecution and litigation histories, and other sources of 
data can provide training datasets, from which machine learning 
algorithms can quickly flag likely issues and provide relevant citations 
and support that could be followed up by a lean corps of human 
examiners.  
Of course, given candor requirements, using an AI will 
dramatically increase the likelihood that the patentee will have to 
disclose art that the examiner might never have become aware. Instead, 
a patentee might prefer to use an alternative blackbox third-party 
service that provides suggested terms without providing concomitant 
information to the patentee about prior art, thus sidestepping away from 
any duty-of-candor issues before the patent office and providing only 
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guidance as to what terms might be problematic, not why those terms 
are problematic. However, the patent office would have access to 
similar technologies so the likelihood that the patentee might come 
across a reference that the examiner would not is not likely.  
V. PROS AND CONS OF A PASS STANDARDIZED CLAIM 
STRUCTURE – FOR EXAMINERS, PATENT DRAFTER, AND 
INVENTORS 
There are many benefits to a standardized claim structure. It 
enables easy comparison of patent claims regardless of the source, i.e., 
the patent drafter. It facilitates comparison of patents with vast areas of 
prior art literature, including those in foreign languages. It also enables 
drafters to quickly see relationships between various patents within a 
family and to easily distinguish new patents from older family 
members or other sources in the prior art. 
Examiners will be able to easily and accurately search for relevant 
prior art, which will help decrease pendency and increase patent 
quality. In addition, some of the examination process can be further 
streamlined using AI, and thus further shortening the patent process.  
Competitors will be able to easily work out freedom to operate 
analyses, thereby avoiding time consuming and costly litigation. And, 
all stakeholders will be able to determine whether the threats of NPEs 
are reasonable or beyond the scope of the presented claims and 
ignorable—effectively confounding the business practices of most 
trolls. 
Patent drafters may worry that such standardization may make 
their jobs obsolete. Instead, such standardization enables patent 
drafters to focus on the most creative portion of patent drafting—
figuring out invention novelty points, and thus make their jobs even 
more valued than before.  
VI. HOW TO ENABLE BROAD ADOPTION OF STANDARDIZED 
CLAIM STRUCTURE? 
We believe that change must start at the USPTO. The USPTO can 
set up incentive programs, such as those similar to the glossary 
initiative,48 where patent applications using the aforementioned 
standardized claim structure can get fast tracked without paying 
additional fees, or only need to pay a reduced examination fees (since 
                                                             
 48. Glossary Pilot Program, 79 Fed. Reg. 17137 (Mar. 27, 2014). See also Glossary 
Initiative, USPTO (Apr. 3, 2016), http://bit.do/USPTO_Glossary. Notably, the initiative had to be 
extended as it had failed to receive even 200 applications by its first deadline. See Welcome to the 
Patent Quality Summit, USPTO (Mar. 25, 2015), http://bit.do/USPTO_Patent-quality-summit. 
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efficiency will be higher), or both. Additionally, regulatory change is 
necessary if we were to allow for a readily accessible post-facto 
rephrasing of all granted patent claims. 
Inventors and patent drafters might worry that prior art is too easy 
to find using such standardized claim structure and thus reduce their 
chance of obtaining a granted patent. To address this concern, we 
recommend the United States adopts aspects of the China Utility Model 
patent.  
As discussed in the book MINING IDEAS FOR DIAMONDS,49 a 
Chinese utility model allows for a two-tiered patent system. Moreover, 
the evaluation report of patent (“ERP”) that accompanies the utility 
model can be used in litigation cases. ERPs are relatively easy to obtain 
and easy to defend. This is because only one or two pieces of prior art, 
which must be references from the same art of technology field, can be 
used to attack the inventiveness or otherwise invalidate a utility model 
patent application.50  
As a reward for such clarity, perhaps prior art should also be 
similar to the Chinese utility model’s ERP, and generally be confined 
to a smaller number of references from the same technology field. This 
may force inventors to file more patent applications to protect their 
inventions due to the narrower-yet-clearer claim structure and may 
later result in lower number of invalidated patents and reduce both 
patent examination and patent drafting costs. Overall, it will be a good 
outcome for the entire patent industry. 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. patent system suffers from a number of ills, many of 
them associated with the continued concerns associated with NPEs, 
PAEs, or other entities exhibiting trolling behavior. In the past, these 
bad actors have upended the patent system to a degree that is heretofore 
unprecedented, resulting in a cheapening of the entire system, an 
inhibition of innovation, and a number of changes to the patent system 
driven solely by removing the threat of trolls.  
None of these attempted changes have been very successful in 
relieving the threat of trolls for all stakeholders. Not only has this 
continued to cost many of the industries that rely on the patent system 
(surprisingly, not the biotechnology industry)51 but it has also forced 
                                                             
 49. ZHANG & FANG, supra note 45, at 28-31. 
 50. Id. at 28. 
 51. Dov Greenbaum, Patent Sharing in Biotechnology, in PATENT PLEDGES: GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON PATENT LAW’S PRIVATE ORDERING FRONTIER 56 (Jorge L. Contreras & 
Meredith Jacob, eds., 2017). 
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many stakeholders to look elsewhere to protect their innovation (e.g., 
through the use of trade secret). 
We propose a new tool to fight trolls and otherwise raise the 
quality of patents, a central issue of the current USPTO. By employing 
AI, NLP, and machine learning to create standardized claim terms, 
syntax, and format, we can create an easy to use system that promotes 
easy-to-understand, easy-to-parse, and easy-to-assess patent claims. 
Standardization is an important if not central concept in all emerging 
technologies; why not enforce it in the regime that protects those 
technologies as well? 
